Changes in stock prices have substantial explanatory power for U.S. investment, especially for longterm samples, and even in the presence of cash flow variables. The stock market dramatically outperforms a standard q-variable because the market-equity component of this variable is only a rough proxy for stock market value. Although the stock market did not predict accurately after the crash of October 1987, the errors were not statistically significant. Parallel relationships for Canada raise the puzzle that Canadian investment appears to react more to the U.S. stock market than to the Canadian market.
The growth rate of investment relates to current and lagged values of proportionate changes in q. An important source of variation in the numerator of q -the market value of capital-is the change in stock market prices, Therefore, q theory can rationalize a positive relation between investment and current and lagged changes in stock market prices, as estimated by Fama (1981) and Barro (1989) , among others.
As is well known [see, e.g., Hayashi (1982) ], the distinction between average and marginal q can cause difficulty in empirical implementations of the theory. For example, changes in relative prices-such as those for energy relative to other goods-may move the stock market in one direction and the incentive to invest in the other direction. That is, marginal q (associated with investment in the new capital, which is suited to the current configuration of relative prices) may rise, while average q (associated with the existing capital) falls. Tax changes, especially when they treat old and new capital differently, can have similar effects. If the data refer to average q, as is typically the case, the theory will perform well only if the dominant disturbances relate to changes in the prospective returns on all forms of capital or to shifts in market discount rates.
The established empirical view [derived from results of von Furstenberg (1977) , Clark (1979) , and Summers (1981) , among others] is that measures of the market value of capital (q-type variables) have only limited explanatory power for investment. Furthermore, when measures of corporate profits or production or similar variables are considered, the statistical significance of the market-valuation variables tends to disappear. Of course, corporate profits and production are simultaneously determined with investment, and this simultaneity can account for the explanatory value of these variables. But the view in the empirical literature is that even predetermined values of variables like profits or production leave market-valuation measures with little predictive power for investment. This conclusion appears to conflict with the strong relations between investment [and other macroeconomic variables, such as gross national product (GNP)] and stock market returns, as reported in Fama (1981) and Barro (1989) . The explanation is that the stock market does better than the measures of q that have been used in previous empirical studies of investment. Table 1 shows regressions with annual U.S. data for DI t , the growth rate of real fixed, nonresidential, private domestic investment. I do not consider broader definitions of investment, which would include expenditures on residential housing and other consumer durables, and perhaps outlays on human capital, since these flows do not relate directly to stock market prices or other variables that measure the market value of business capital. Results for the corporate component of investment, which relates naturally to the stock market and to corporate profits, are similar to those for my broader concept of business investment.
Results for U.S. Investment and GNP
The investment variable consists of expenditures on capital goods and is therefore gross of depreciation. In some models (in which adjustment costs pertain to gross expenditures rather than to net investment), it is gross investment that relates naturally to q-type variables. However, in other settings (in which replacement expenditures do not entail any adjustment cost), it is net investment that would be associated with q. In any event, since available measures of depreciation are largely arbitrary, the choice of gross investment tends to be dictated on grounds of data availability.
The sample periods considered in Table 1 , which exclude dates around World Wars I and II, are 1891 -1914 , 1921 -1940 , 1948 1921 -1940 , 1948 and 1948-1987 (1939) index for the value of all stocks. The inflation rate for the GNP deflator (year t relative to year t -1) was subtracted from the change in nominal stock prices to compute real changes. Although the timing of inflation and stock returns is off slightly, the adjustment of the nominal returns for inflation has, in any event, only a minor effect on the results.
DProf t : The first difference of the ratio of after-tax corporate profits to GNP (the value for year t less that for year t -1). For 1929 , corporate profits are the standard national accounts' numbers, which adjust for capital consumption and inventory revaluation. Numbers for 1919-1928 (provided by Changyong Rhee) are after-tax corporate profits as reported in issues of Internal Revenue Service Statistics of Income.
Dq t : Growth rate of q (year t relative to year t -1), where q t is an annual average for year t. The measure of q t , constructed by Blanchard, Rhee, and Summers (1988) and provided by Changyong Rhee, is an estimate of the ratio of total nominal market value of nonfinancial corporations (equity plus net debt) to capital stock at nominal reproduction cost. The figures on the capital stock include standard estimates of depreciation. The variable used makes no separate adjustment for taxes. The underlying data are annual averages for 1900-1958 and quarterly averages for 1952-1987 . In order to obtain a series that was comparable to the earlier data, annual averages of the quarterly figures were used to construct q t for 1958 and Dq t for 1959 DY t : Growth rate of real GNP (year t relative to year t -1).
Regressions 1 and 2 of Table 1 apply to the period 1891-1914, 1921-1940, 1948-1987 , for which I lacked data on corporate profits and q. Regression 1 shows the substantial explanatory power of the one-year-lagged real stock price change, Stock The use of nominal stock price changes, rather than real changes, makes only a minor difference. For example, if the one-year lag of the nominal price change is substituted for the real change in regression 1, the estimated coefficient changes little and the R 2 falls from 0.67 to 0.65. The effect is minor because the nominal capital gain on stocks is much more volatile than inflation. Over the period 1891-1914, 1921-1940, 1948-1987 , the standard deviation of the nominal capital gain is 0.19, while that for inflation is 0.04; hence, the correlation between the nominal and real capital gains on stocks turns out to be 0.975. Despite this high correlation, the results for investment do indicate a preference for the real capital gain as an explanatory variable. If nominal and real gains are included simultaneously, the estimated coefficient of the lagged nominal gain is 0.01, SE = 0.23, while that on the lagged real gain is 0.56, SE = 0.23. Thus, as theory predicts, the data indicate that investment relates to the change in real market value, rather than nominal market value.
Regressions 3 to 9 of Table 1 deal with the period [1921] [1922] [1923] [1924] [1925] [1926] [1927] [1928] [1929] [1930] [1931] [1932] [1933] [1934] [1935] [1936] [1937] [1938] [1939] [1940] . Regression 3, which includes the one-year lag of the real stock price change; is similar to regression 1. Regression 4 shows that-with the stock market variable omitted-the variable Dq t-1 has some explanatory value for DI t , although the R 2 is only 0.31. This finding is consistent with those reported in the empirical literature. Regression 5 shows that the stock-price change dominates the q-variable-the estimated coefficient of Dq t-1 , -0.03, SE = 0.08-is essentially zero, while that on Stock t-1 is about the same as that shown in regression 3.
These results are surprising in that the q-variable takes account of stock market valuation and also considers the market value of net debt. In addition, the variable allows for changes in the stock of capital at reproduction cost. Thus, q measures total market value per unit of physical capital. In contrast, even without changes in the market value of debt, stock price indices err in not adjusting for retained earnings.
To see why the stock price variable outperformed standard measures of q, I broke down the Blanchard-Rhee-Summers (1988) construct into its components (see their appendix II). The numerator of q is the sum of the nominal market values of equity and net debt of nonfinancial corporations, where debt is measured net of non-interest-bearing assets (such as cash, consumer credit, and accounts receivable). The denominator of q is the estimated nominal replacement cost of total tangible assets of nonfinancial corporations. It turns out that the growth rate of q, Dq, is dominated by the growth rate of the market value of equity-the correlation of the two variables over the period [1921] [1922] [1923] [1924] [1925] [1926] [1927] [1928] [1929] [1930] [1931] [1932] [1933] [1934] [1935] [1936] [1937] [1938] [1939] [1940] is 0.94. The reason is that the change in the value of equity is far more volatile than the fluctuations in net debt or the replacement cost of capital. Accordingly, the explanatory value of Dq t-1 for investment that shows up when Stock,-, is omitted (line 4 of Table 1 ) reflects entirely the influence of the equity component. With the lagged value of the growth rate of the market value of equity entered by itself, the R 2 for the growth rate of investment is 0.31-the same as that on line 4. The other components of Dq t-1 are jointly insignificant if added to this regression Thus, the features that Dq adds to the change in the market value of equity turn out to be quantitatively unimportant.
Since the change in q reflects mainly the change in equity value, one would have expected Dq t-1 to perform about as well as Stock,-, in an investment equation. This expectation turns out to be incorrect (line 5 of Table 1 ) because the computed equity component of q is a rough proxy for stock market valuation. Over the period [1921] [1922] [1923] [1924] [1925] [1926] [1927] [1928] [1929] [1930] [1931] [1932] [1933] [1934] [1935] [1936] [1937] [1938] [1939] [1940] , the correlation of Stock, with the part of Dq t that consists of the growth rate of the nominal value of equity is only 0.45. (Using the nominal stock price variable, which matches up better with the growth rate of nominal equity, the correlation is 0.54.) The discrepancy seems to reflect the calculation of the market value of equity as the ratio of annual dividends to estimated dividend-price ratios. In addition, the computed growth rate of market equity involves a first difference of an annual average, whereas the variable Stock, is the growth rate of stock prices over year t.
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Regression 6 In Table 1 shows that, with Stock t-1 and Dq t-1 omitted, the lagged profit variable, DProf t-1 , has significant explanatory power for DI t (coefficient of 5.0, SE = 1.1), although the R 2 is only 0.34. With Stock t-1 also included in regression 7, DProf t-1 becomes less important (coefficient of 2.1, SE = 0.8), but is still significantly positive. However, the lagged stock-price change, Stock t-1 , plays the main predictive role-the coefficient here is 0.48, SE = 0.05.
Regression 8 adds contemporaneous values of the changes in stock prices and the profit ratio. The current stock market variable, Stock t , is insignificant, but the current change in the profit ratio, DProf t , is highly significant (coefficient of 3.4, SE = 0.6). Even so, the lagged variables remain significant-the coefficient of Stock,-, is now 0.31, SE = 0.05, while that on DProf t-1 is 2.1, SE = 0.6. (Regression 9 shows that the addition of the contemporaneous and lagged values of Dq has little effect on the results.)
I would interpret regression 8 by thinking again about an exogenous disturbance, such as a change in the prospective return on capital. The results suggest that this kind of shock has an immediate reflection in stock market valuation and some contemporaneous effect on the ratio of corporate profits to GNP. The principal effect on investment expenditures and the larger impact on the profit ratio show up with a one-year lag. As would be expected, there is no lagged effect on stock prices-that is, the full adjustment of financial prices is contemporaneous with the disturbance.
Results for the 1948-1987 sample (regressions 10 to 16 in Table  1 ) are similar to those for the period 1921-1940, 1948-1987. 4 One difference is that the estimated coefficients on the lagged stock market variable, Stock t-1 , and the current change in the profit ratio, DProf t , are smaller than before. For 1953 . the correlation between Stock, (the growth rate of teal stock prices) and the growth rate of the nominal market value of equity-based on fourth-quarter-to-fourth-quarter values-is 0.88. Using annual averages for the market value of equity, the correlation is only 0.65. Thus, the use of annual averages accounts for a substantial part of the discrepancy for the 1953-1987 period. The results are basically the same if changes in nominal stock prim are used instead of changes in real stock prices. It also remains true in the quarterly data that the change in the market value of equity is the dominant component of Dq. For 1953 1954-1987. 5 Changes in nominal interest rates-such as the commercial paper rate-are significant for DI t over the 1948-1987 period but not for the longer samples. In the post-World War II period, the estimated Table 2 shows regressions with the dependent variable changed to the growth rate of real GNP. The results are similar to those shown in Table 1 , although the estimated coefficients on Stock and DProf tend to be smaller in Table 2 . These results are in accordance with the much greater volatility of investment than of GNP.
Forecasts Associated with the Stock Market Crashes of 1987 and 1929
The stock market crash of October 1987 produced a change in the logarithm of nominal stock prices for that month of -0. 1891-1914, 1921-1940, 1948-1987 (Table 1, regression 1, and Table 2 , regression 1), the stock market crash implied that the forecasted annual growth rates for 1988 over 1987 fell from 0.123 to -0.021 for investment and from 0.059 to 0.021 for GNP. The sensitivity of these growth forecasts to the stock market is reduced if one uses estimates based on the 1948-1987 sample. Using the regressions for this period (Table 1, regression 14, and Table 2 , regression 9), the projected growth rates for 1988 over 1987 fell from 0.066 to -0.004 for investment and from 0.049 to 0.023 for GNP. (I assume here that corporate profits for 1987 were not altered along with the stock market crash.) In any event, the crash corresponded to a revision from a forecast of a strong boom for 1988 to a prediction of below-average growth.
The actual economic performance for 1988 turned out to be strong; growth rates for 1988 over 1987 were 0.081 for investment and 0.043 for GNP. Table 3 compares these outcomes with forecasts based on regressions from the various samples covered in Tables 1 and 2 . Although the actual growth rates exceed the projected values in each case, the gap is never statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Thus, while the stock market did not predict well for 1988, one cannot conclude with any confidence from this observation that the economy has shifted to a new regime where the stock market is generally unreliable. In other words, given the typical margin of error for the sample, the incorrect forecasts for 1988 are not very unusual.
The last two cases in Table 3 consider the forecasts for 1930-1932 that would have emerged after the stock market crash of 1929. In this case, regressions for the growth of investment and GNP were estimated (based on lagged growth and the lagged change in real stock prices) over the period [1921] [1922] [1923] [1924] [1925] [1926] [1927] [1928] [1929] . While the plunge in stock prices accurately predicted a decline in economic activity after 1929, the forecasts substantially understate the extent of the decline in this case. 6 For GNP growth, the gap between forecasted and actual values for 1930-1932 is statistically significant at the 5 percent level while for investment growth the gap is not significant Putting 1987 and 1929 together, there is no indication that stock market crashes are systematically Ignored in terms of the response of economic activity. In the recent case, the economy did better than stock market-based predictions would have said, while in the earlier case, the reverse applied. One likely possibility is that stock market crashes occur at times when economic conditions are volatile, so that forecast errors are higher than usual. But, in terms of the forecast mean, there is no reason to think that economic activity relates differently to stock returns at times of stock market crashes than at other times. Table 4 shows results for the annual growth of investment and GNP over the long-term sample (1891-1914, 1921-1940, 1948-1987) us-ing monthly changes in real stock prices as regressors. Each monthly term is the logarithm of stock prices at the end of the month less the logarithm of stock prices at the end of the previous month. To get a rough estimate of the change in real stock prices, I subtracted the inflation rate for the year (expressed on a monthly basis), calculated from the annual GNP deflator. In other words, the inflation rate used is the same for all 12 months within a given year.
Results with Monthly Stock Price Changes
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The regression for investment shows that this year's growth rate (annual average of investment for year t relative to that for year t -1) relates especially to real stock price changes between May and December of the previous year 8 Estimated coefficients for monthly 7 The results are similar if changes in nominal stock prices are used instead of changes in real stock price, although the fit for Investment is somewhat better with the real prices. (The fit for GNP is virtually identical with real or nominal prices.) It would be possible to use monthly inflation rates for the consumer price index (CPI) back to 1913 or for wholesale prices for the entire sample, although the accuracy of the earlier data is unclear. (Even in recent times the "monthly" figures do not always refer to prices sampled within the indicated month.) I think that the results would not change much with a shift to monthly inflation numbers, because the main function of the adjustment for inflation is to capture the secular changes in the inflation rate. The inflation rates calculated from the annual GNP deflator are satisfactory in this respect. 8 For samples prior to World War II, the data on investment and GNP are available only on an annual basis. Therefore, I related annual growth rates of investment and GNP to a distributed lag of monthly stock price changes. Even for the post-world War II period, my experience is that little additional information obtains by using quarterly, father than annual, values of the national accounts' stock price changes in the current year turn out to be insignificant, as do those for changes prior to December two years previous. The standard error of each coefficient on monthly stock price movements is fairly high (about 0.2), which allows for a good deal of random variation in point estimates from month to month. Nevertheless, there is some indication of a distributed lag pattern for the coefficients that rises between December and September of the previous year and then gradually diminishes to reach close to zero within about 15 months. The results for GNP, also shown in Table 4 , reveal a similar pattern. Table 5 shows regression results for the growth rate of real fixed, nonresidential, private domestic investment in Canada for the period 1928-1940, 1948-1987. (The main national accounts data for Canada begin in 1926, although some earlier data are available.) The growth rate of real stock prices is based on the Toronto 300 composite index. Values of q for Canada were unavailable. Regressions 1 to 4-which use data on investment, real stock prices, and after-tax corporate profits as a ratio to GNP-are comparable to results shown in Table 1 for the United States. Regression 1 shows the explanatory power of lagged changes in real stock prices for the growth of investment. The main difference from the U.S. case is that the R 2 of 0.61 is somewhat lower. (Over the period [1928] [1929] [1930] [1931] [1932] [1933] [1934] [1935] [1936] [1937] [1938] [1939] [1940] , the R 2 for a parallel U.S. regression is 0.72.) Regression 3 shows that, as with the United States, the lagged change in the corporate profit ratio has some additional explanatory power for the growth of investment. In regression 4, the contemporaneous stock price change is again insignificant for the growth of investment. The current change in the corporate profits ratio is significant, but-unlike for the United States-the lagged value has a larger coefficient (and greater t-value) than the contemporaneous value.
Comparison of Results for Canada and the United States
It is often argued that the U.S. economy has a large, perhaps dominant, influence on the Canadian economy. Therefore, it is natural to consider U.S. variables as regressors for Canadian investment growth. Regression 5 adds the U.S. lagged variables that I used before to explain U.S. investment growth-DI t-1 , Stock t-1 , and DProf t-1 -to an equation for Canadian investment growth. This equation also includes the Canadian lagged variables as regressors-that is, the same set of variables included in regression 3 of Table 5 . The striking variables. Much of the true underlying information comes from annual data, and the quarterly observations also bring in important variations resulting from seasonals. result in regression 5 is that the lagged change in U.S. stock prices is significant (0.43, SE = 0.14), while the lagged change in Canadian stock prices is insignificant (-0.13, SE = 0.16).
9 That is, changes in U.S. stock prices predict growth in Canadian investment, but-holding fixed the behavior of the U.S. stock market-the change in Canadian stock prices has no predictive value for growth in Canadian investment. The apparent predictive role for the Canadian stock market in regressions 1, 3, and 4 of Table 5 can be attributed to the strong positive correlation (0.87) between the changes in Canadian and U.S. real stock prices over the sample period.
Instead of entering the three lagged U.S. variables separately, one can combine them into the implied forecast for U.S. investment growth. The variable DI t in regression 6 of Table 5 is the fitted value from a regression (over the sample period [1928] [1929] [1930] [1931] [1932] [1933] [1934] [1935] [1936] [1937] [1938] [1939] [1940] of U.S. investment growth on a constant and the U.S. values of DI t-1 , Stock t-1 , and DProf t-1 . Note that the fit of regression 6 is virtually the same as that of regression 5. Therefore, the usual likelihood-ratio test accepts the hypothesis that the U.S. variables matter for Canadian investment growth only to the extent that these variables predict U.S. investment growth.
Regression 7 in Table 5 shows that the conclusion about the insignificance of Canadian stock price changes for Canadian investment growth still holds if one includes the contemporaneous values, Stock t or DProf t , for Canada. Regressions 8 and 9 show that the same conclusion also applies if one replaces the forecasted value of U.S. investment growth, DI t , with the actual value, DI t .
The results on the connection between Canadian investment and the Canadian and U.S. stock markets are less clear if one limits attention to the post-World War II period. With only the lagged Canadian variables included, the coefficient of Stock t-1 for the 1948-1987 sample is 0.14, SE = 0.07, which is much smaller than the value (0.33, SE = 0.08) shown in regression 3 of Table 5 . With the lagged U.S. values also entered, the coefficient of Stock t-1 for Canada again becomes insignificant-the estimate is -0.05, SE = 0.15, which is similar to the value (-0.13, SE = 0.16) shown in regression 5. However, while the coefficient of Stock t-1 for the United States is positive, it is now statistically insignificant-the estimated value is 0.23, SE = 0.16. Thus, the results for the 1948-1987 period are consistent with the idea that Canadian investment relates more to the U.S. stock market than to the Canadian market. But the results also indicate that Canadian investment is only weakly related to developments on either stock market over this period. The main evidence for a link between the U.S. stock market and Canadian investment comes when the data from 1928-1940 are added to the sample (as in Table 5 ). Thus, the behavior during the depressed 1930s plays a major role in the findings.
It is not surprising that the U.S. economy should have a significant influence on Canadian investment. For example, a boom in the United States could raise the return on Canadian capital and thereby stimulate Canadian investment. But, in this scenario, the U.S. boom would also raise the market value of Canadian capital-that is, Canadian stock prices (and q) would rise. If these market values were held fixed, it is unclear why U.S. events would influence Canadian investment. Therefore, assuming that the Canadian stock market is a good measure of the market value of capital in Canada, the results shown in Table  5 (regressions 5 to 9) are puzzling.
One possibility is that the stock price index that I used-the Toronto 300 composite-is not a very good measure of the market value of capital located in Canada. I have, however, been assured by some Canadian researchers that this measure is the best available broad index of Canadian stock market prices.
Another consideration is that much of Canadian domestic investment is carried out by U.S. firms. The shares in these firms are typically traded on the U.S. stock market rather than the Canadian market. Thus, to the extent that Canadian investment is carried out by foreigners (specifically, Americans), there is a good reason that Canadian investment would not relate to the Canadian stock market. But, it must be the case overall that the Canadian stock market is more accurate than the U.S. market as an indicator of the value of capital in place in Canada. Thus, I am skeptical that this element accounts for the results in Table 5 .
A familiar problem with the empirical implementation of q theory is the distinction between marginal and average q, with the theory relating more to the former and the data to the latter. This distinction would be particularly helpful if I were trying to explain why neither Canadian nor U.S. stock prices did very well in predicting Canadian investment. However, the main puzzle is why the U.S. stock market does as well as it does in predicting Canadian investment, especially over the period [1928] [1929] [1930] [1931] [1932] [1933] [1934] [1935] [1936] [1937] [1938] [1939] [1940] .
The general problems with using average q to proxy for marginal q would apply to both the U.S. and Canadian stock markets. But one reason why this element might matter more for Canada is that Canadian production and investment are more related to natural resources, specifically to energy, than are U.S. production and investment. Since the distinction between marginal and average q is particularly impor-tant when there are variations in the relative price of energy, it is conceivable that the U.S. stock market is better than the Canadian stock market as a proxy for marginal q (averaged over industries) in Canada. Therefore, an argument along these lines might explain why Canadian investment relates more to the U.S. stock market than to the Canadian market. One reason for skepticism, however, is that the strongest role for the U.S. stock market in the Canadian investment equation emerges-when the period 1928-1940 is also included. This period, which substantially predates the times of oil shocks, is not one in which the natural resource story is likely to be compelling.
Summary of Major Findings
Many empirical studies have related business investment to q, which is the ratio of the market's valuation of capital to the long-run cost of acquiring new capital. A typical finding in this literature is that q-measures have only limited predictive value for investment. In contrast, I find for the United States-especially for long samples that begin in 1891 or 1921-that lagged changes in real stock market prices have a great deal of explanatory power for the growth rate of investment. Moreover, for the period since 1921 for which data on a standard q-type variable are available, the stock market variable dramatically outperforms q. Empirically, changes in q are dominated by movements in the market value of equity; the changes in the market value of net debt and in the stock of capital at estimated reproduction cost are relatively minor. Therefore, the main reason for the results is that the equity component of the q variable turns out to be only a rough proxy for stock market value.
Even in the presence of cash flow variables, such as contemporaneous and lagged values of after-tax corporate profits, the stock market variable retains significant predictive power for investment. An overall interpretation of these results is that an exogenous disturbance (such as an increase in the prospective rate of return on capital) shows up contemporaneously as an increase in stock prices and corporate profits, and with a lag of a year or more as an expansion of investment expenditures and a further increase in profits.
I examined the stock market crashes of 1929 and 1987. In the former case, subsequent investment spending (for 1930-1932) performed worse than the stock market would have predicted, while in the latter case, the subsequent spending (for 1988) was surprisingly strong. Nevertheless, one cannot conclude with any confidence that the relation between stock prices and investment (or GNP) is systematically different in the context of stock market crashes than at other times.
For Canada since 1928, a simple relation between investment and stock price changes (and corporate profits) looks similar to that for the United States. However, when the interaction between the two countries is considered, it turns out that the U.S. stock market has more predictive power than the Canadian market for Canadian investment. Some possible explanations for this puzzling finding were discussed, but none of the explanations seem very convincing.
